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As everyone who is acquainted with him knows, Andrew Bowie is a wonderful jazz saxophonist.1 
He’s also an expert improviser more generally. I say this not only to share my high regard for his 
music, but also to explain the provenance of this article, which originated in a formal response to 
Bowie’s keynote address at the inaugural conference of the Performance Philosophy Network 
(University of Surrey, April 2013). Bowie’s talk at this event was improvised from outline notes, 
and since my improvisation skills are not, I admit readily, as finely honed as Bowie’s, I decided not 
to attempt to respond impromptu to his address. I responded instead – with the blessing of the 
conference organisers – to his 2007 book Music, Philosophy, and Modernity as it related to some 
key themes of his talk. The same is true of the present short article: although it appears alongside 
the written-up version of Bowie’s talk and focuses on themes arising from that piece, it remains a 
response primarily to those themes as expressed in his book. 
Music, Philosophy, and Modernity has two central themes. The first is the rejection of what we 
might call ‘the philosophy of x,’ an approach whereby, on Bowie’s account, human practices are 
seen as objects of philosophy or as problems for philosophy to solve. These human practices 
could, in principle, range from architecture to zoology, but Bowie’s preferred example, in his book 
and elsewhere, is the philosophy of music. Bowie rejects the philosophy of music. The second of 
Bowie’s two themes is the proposition of an alternative to the philosophy of music, namely a 
philosophy, or a type of insight, that arises from music. In his book, Bowie asks from a variety of 
angles what philosophy might look like were it to take music as a point of departure. Music, to 
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take a simple example, can draw our attention to the non-linguistic or non-conceptual aspects of 
human existence, and this may serve as a starting point for a philosophy that aims for more than 
conceptual clarification. A key feature of Bowie’s work is that these themes are seen to be two 
sides of the same coin. On the one hand, Bowie’s rejection of the philosophy of music, and of the 
whole ‘philosophy of x’ approach, leads him to seek alternative ways of doing philosophy; on the 
other hand, Bowie’s proposition that we might practice a philosophy arising from music leads him 
to reject the philosophy of music. 
Although Bowie takes the phrase ‘philosophy of music’ primarily to denote philosophy as usually 
practiced under that name (and the supposedly objectifying tendencies of such philosophy), he 
also suggests an alternative meaning of that phrase: that it could be used to denote precisely 
that philosophy that might arise from music (Bowie 2007, 11). For the sake of simplicity, however, 
I use the phrase ‘philosophy of music’ only in Bowie’s primary sense; for Bowie’s alternative 
approach, I use the term ‘philosophy from music.’ 
I agree entirely with Bowie that there is much to be gained by asking what philosophy might look 
like were it inspired by music, and some of the ways in which he explores how this could be the 
case are quite ingenious. In particular, his recuperation to this end of too-often ignored themes 
from the history of European philosophy (an ongoing project reaching back at least as far as 
Bowie [1990] 2003) is of unequivocal significance. I disagree with Bowie, however, that his 
proposal of a philosophy from music necessitates a rejection of the philosophy of music, or that 
there are sufficient grounds simply to dismiss the philosophy of music on the basis of its own 
faults. For the sake of interest, I focus here on these disagreements. 
Particularly with regard to Bowie’s rejection of the philosophy of music, his writing is often 
strongly worded, taking the form of a prosecution in a court case, and much of what follows is my 
attempt at putting forward the case for the defence. Worth noting, however, is that my own 
professional background is not as a philosopher of music, but as a historical musicologist. I may 
be playing the role of defender, but I am not the defendant. This is notable for two reasons. First, 
whilst Bowie’s work has often been ignored within the philosophy of music, it has received 
significant attention in musicology. Of the several excellent reviews of Bowie’s book that came 
out in the years following its publication, for example, three (Currie 2008, Dammann 2008, and 
Garratt 2010) came from authors with musicological backgrounds. (Other reviews include Goehr 
2009, from a philosopher seriously engaged with musicological pursuits, and Khalifa 2009.) 
Second, and more importantly, musicology has itself often been dismissive of the philosophy of 
music, for reasons usually left unstated, but which tend to run along the same lines as Bowie’s 
critique. Whether this is due to Bowie’s own influence or should be traced rather to shared 
intellectual roots is not of consequence here. The key point is that Bowie’s rejection of the 
philosophy of music has found a welcome – if not uncritical – reception in musicological circles. 
Bowie’s rejection of the philosophy of music is, however, illegitimate. It is illegitimate for two 
reasons. First, he mischaracterises the philosophy of music. Second, even if his characterisation 
of the philosophy of music were a faithful representation of that discipline, his reasons for 
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rejecting it would still not be sufficient. We might usefully label his characterisations of the 
philosophy of music as premises, and his reasons for rejecting such philosophy as his argument. 
Couched in this language, his premises are false and his argument is invalid. 
More simply, he aims for the wrong target – and misses anyway. 
Let’s start with Bowie’s characterisation of the philosophy of music. Bowie seems to have two 
main criticisms of such philosophy. The first is that it sees music as a static object out there in the 
world, as opposed to an ever-changing human practice. This is apparent, allegedly, in the way 
that the philosophy of music seeks always to make universalising claims, and in its relentless 
focus on musical works. As Bowie puts it in his contribution to the present volume: 
the philosophy of x makes x the object of conceptual determination: this can be 
exemplified in the way that the analytical philosophy of art is often just an 
exercise in ontology, which seeks to establish the criteria, for example, of a 
‘musical work,’ on the basis of whether it is the score, a performance, all 
performances, etc. (Bowie 2015, 53; for examples of similar claims in Bowie 2007, 
see pp. 1-4 and 378-79.) 
Now, I’m no philosopher of music, but I know just about enough of the subject to be able to see 
straight away that this criticism is unfounded. It is unfounded because it ignores the large body 
of literature in the philosophy of music examining music as a human practice, such as that 
engaging issues of improvisation and performance. I am thinking here, for example, of the work 
of Philip Alperson (1984) or Paul Thom (1993). It is unfounded because even in its most 
ontological enquiries, the philosophy of music is sensitive to the genre of the music under 
investigation. This is the case, for example, in Theodore Gracyk’s investigations into the ontology 
of rock music (Gracyk 1996, see especially chapters 1-3). It is unfounded because even in the case 
of work-based instrumental music, ontological investigations frequently reach historical 
conclusions. Such is the case, for example, in the hugely influential work of Jerrold Levinson 
(1990). I have been careful here to choose examples that pre-date Bowie’s book, but in the years 
since the book came out, the philosophy of music has continued to diversify, engaging topics 
ranging from evolution (Davies 2012) to feminist musicology (Zangwill 2014), and much else 
besides. 
Bowie’s second objection to the philosophy of music is as follows: 
Even in the contemporary philosophical situation, where grand foundational 
systems have largely been abandoned, the problem for the ‘philosophy of music’ 
is that it must rely upon whatever other philosophical assumptions are adopted 
by the person producing it. Such philosophy is therefore likely just to confirm the 
non- or extra-musical assumptions that precede its application to music... the 
‘philosophy of music’ inevitably just limps behind whatever philosophical 
bandwagon happens to be running at a particular time or is adopted by the 
philosopher of music. (Bowie 2007, 10) 
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This objection is also unfounded. Again, it is unfounded because it does not reflect what actually 
goes on in the philosophy of music. It is certainly true that philosophers of music often approach 
their topic with a prior philosophical theory. Their philosophical assumptions, however, are not 
simply applied to music, but are tested against it; and if the theory in question does not work in 
the particular case of music, this theory will be revised or rejected. This often leads to theories of 
art in general being affirmed or refused on the basis of their applicability to musical issues. 
Further, Bowie’s whole distinction between philosophy of music and philosophy from music, 
whilst methodologically useful, crumbles in the face of key works in the mainstream philosophy 
of music which precisely do take music as their starting point. Again, there are many cases to 
choose from, but one might cite here Aaron Ridley’s use of examples ranging from Delius to Ives 
to interrogate concepts such as musical understanding (Ridley 2004), or the meditations of Garry 
Hagberg (2009) and Jerrold Levinson (2013) on jazz improvisation and jazz standards as ethical 
microcosms. 
One has to ask from where Bowie gets his own particular impression of the philosophy of music. 
The figure on whom Bowie draws most heavily in characterising this discipline is Peter Kivy, and 
much of Bowie’s criticism of Kivy’s work is valuable (see especially chapter 1 of Bowie 2007). The 
philosophy of music, however, is – as I have already pointed out – a diverse field, and influential 
though Kivy’s work has been, his own personal views can in no way be taken as representative of 
the tradition as a whole. Indeed, much of his work has been critiqued extensively from within the 
philosophy of music (see, for example, the objections to Kivy’s theory of musical expressiveness 
in part four of Robinson 2005). Further, despite discussing some of Kivy’s most important works 
(such as Kivy 1993), Bowie nonetheless engages only a small portion of Kivy’s extensive output, 
excluding, for example, any consideration of Kivy’s ground-breaking work on musical 
performance (Kivy 1995). Bowie’s characterisation of the philosophy of music, then, is inaccurate 
and, as such, his rejection of this tradition on the basis of such a characterisation is untenable. 
I feel at this point that my argument has been somewhat lacking in sophistication – that I have 
done little more than to outline a few recent (or, rather, not so recent) trends in the philosophy of 
music. The unfortunate truth, however, is that this is all that is needed to rebuff Bowie’s hollow 
stereotype of this field. Nonetheless, I would like to raise another, broader issue. This is that the 
way in which Bowie rejects the philosophy of music is questionable even by his own standards, and 
would remain so even if his characterisation of the philosophy of music were accurate. Bowie’s 
rejection of the philosophy of music is, in fact, questionable on the very same grounds on which 
he criticises the philosophy of music. Let me explain what I mean.  
One of Bowie’s major objections to the philosophy of music is that it treats music only as a static 
object, rather than as an ever-changing human practice. And as we have seen, the philosophy of 
music is not guilty on this count. Bowie, however, does have a case to answer on this very same 
count. He has a case to answer precisely because of the way in which he characterises the 
philosophy of music. Such philosophy is a rich, diverse, and ever-changing human practice. Yet 
Bowie insists on treating it as a single, static object, making sweeping generalisations about what 
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it is and what it does. 
We might put this another way by examining Bowie’s views on the relation between self and 
other. Near the beginning of his book, Bowie draws approvingly on the work of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, in order to make a point about different ways of encountering one’s other. Bowie 
writes: 
For Gadamer, encounter with the other in the form of coming to understand their 
languages, including the language of music, can tell us more about what we are 
than many of the objectifying forms of studying human behaviour. It is when we 
don’t understand and have to leave behind our certainties that we can gain the 
greatest insights. (Bowie 2007, 11) 
In the present context, Bowie’s ‘other’ is the philosophy of music, yet Bowie refuses to attempt to 
understand the language it speaks or to leave behind his certainties. In direct contradiction of his 
own wise counsel, Bowie refuses seriously to engage with his other. 
Since Bowie’s work is, here, my own other, I’d like to conclude on an upbeat note. First, I would 
stress again that the positive side of Bowie’s project, the proposition of a philosophy arising from 
music is rather brilliant. I would also suggest, though, that the arguments that Bowie employs in 
the course of his dismissal of the philosophy of music could be of use, if only it were admitted 
that they were simply arguments against particular trends or theories in the philosophy of music, 
rather than arguments against the philosophy of music as a single whole. Were this made clear, 
and were it spoken in a language that philosophers of music could understand (on this point, see 
also Dammann 2008, 461), then Bowie’s work could end up broadening its influence beyond its 
already wide readership to become instrumental, canonical even, precisely within the philosophy 
of music. Indeed, this is pretty much the opposite of Bowie’s intentions, but his work could even 
end up breathing new life into the very discipline that he has spent so long trying to dismiss. 
Notes 
1 In addition its provenance at the inaugural Performance Philosophy conference, this material was also 
presented as part of a colloquium paper at Indiana University in January 2015. I thank the audiences at both 
events for their insightful questions and comments. For advice, assistance, and good conversation at various 
stages of writing this piece, my thanks go to Nick Zangwill, Jerrold Levinson, Elizabeth Stoner, Andrew Mead, and 
Elizabeth Swann. My gratitude goes also to Andrew Bowie for his good humour, amongst much else. 
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